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ABSTRACT

Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, a certain "patent
thicket" effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly
difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.
Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they
necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often
subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new
cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies. The
difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g. hold-out problems) for all such
patents has the potential to stifle the development and
commercialization of these new technologies. As such, patent pooling,
once condemned as facilitating antitrust violations in past eras, has
been reintroduced as a practice that, if properly structured, has
potentially strong pro-competitive benefits. Patent pooling has the
potential to reduce the level of research and invention in new
technologies that can compete with an incumbent standard. Recent
patent jurisprudence and lenient federal antitrust agency of recent
patent pooling proposals seem to create an environment that
encourages the resurgence of patent pooling.
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The master programmer stared at the novice. "And what would you do
to remedy this state of affair?" he asked.
The novice thought for a moment. "I will design a new editing
program," he said, "a program that will replace all these others."
Suddenly, the master struck the novice on the side of his head. It was
not a heavy blow, but the novice was nonetheless surprised. What did you
do that for?" exclaimed the novice.
"I have no wish to learn another editing program," said the master.
And suddenly, the novice was enlightened.
from The Zen ofProgramming

I.

INTRODUCTION:

PATENT POOLING IN JAPAN

Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, commentators have observed
a certain "patent thicket" effect that may be impeding what has become an
increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically,
as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become
increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple
patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational
technologies. 2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., hold-out problems) for all
such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of
these new technologies.
As such, patent pooling, once condemned as facilitating
antitrust violations in past eras, has been reintroduced as a practice that, if properly
structured, has potentially strong pro-competitive benefits. However, while the most
recent patent pooling literature extols its pro-competitive virtues and ability to
reduce the problematic patent thicket, none seem to adequately examine the
innovation effects of patent pooling with regard to standard-setting technologies.
This lack of literature is understandable because innovation, as opposed to
commercialization, does not seem to have been weakened by the patent thicket.

* The author is an associate in the Intellectual Property and Technology Group-IP Strategies
and Transactions Practice at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP in Palo Alto, CA. He has
a B.A. in computer science and economics from Amherst College (1995), M.S. in computer science
from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1998), and J.D. from the University of
Chicago (2001). The author would like to thank the following for their helpful discussions, criticisms
and comments: Steven Feldman, Scott Kief, Randy Picker, Matthew Sag, Joseph Yang, and Daniel
Weitzner.
1 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, PatentPools, and Standard
Setting, NBER Conference on Innovation Policy and the Economy (May 4, 2000).
2 See id. at 1.
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However, if patent pooling practices increase in highly standardized industries such
as software, as is likely to be the case, the patent thicket may be cleared, but
research and innovation in those industries may become misdirected or even stifled.
As described in this Article, patent pooling has the potential to reduce the level of
research and invention in new technologies that can compete with an incumbent
standard. In addition to the recent pro-patent pooling literature, recent patent
jurisprudence and lenient federal antitrust agency of recent patent pooling proposals
do seem to create an environment that encourages the resurgence of patent pooling.
In particular, recent patent jurisprudence has narrowed the scope of patent
protection that ultimately may lead to an increase in the "narrow" patents that are
needed to commercialize a technology. As such, before delving into the innovation
effects of patent pooling in standardized industries, this Introduction offers as
motivation a brief comparison of the U.S. patent system to the Japanese patent
system, where patent scope is narrow and patent pooling is a common industry
practice.
On November 29, 2000, the Federal Circuit, in a landmark decision, essentially
ruled that no range of equivalents is available for patent claims whose scope has
been narrowed by amendment. 3 The Festo decision severely limits the doctrine of
equivalents under the patent laws of the United States. 4 As a result, the scope of

3 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563-64 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
cert. granted,533 U.S. 915 (2001). The court provided the following answers to four questions that
were posed for briefing: (1) for determining whether an amendment for a claim represents
prosecution estoppel history, "a substantial reason related to patentability," Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25 (1997), is not limited to overcoming prior art, but
includes other reasons related to the statutory requirements for a patent; (2) "voluntary" claim
amendments are treated the same as other claim amendments; (3) when a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel, no range of equivalents is available for the amended claim element;
and (4) "unexplained" amendments are not entitled to any range of equivalents.
On June 18, 2001 the Supreme Court granted Festo's petition for writ of certiorari and is
scheduled to hear oral arguments on January 8, 2002. 533 U.S. 915 (2001). Festo presents two
questions for the Court's consideration: (1) whether every claim-narrowing amendment designed to
comply with any provision of the Patent Act - including those provisions not related to prior art automatically creates prosecution history estoppel regardless of the reason for the amendment; and
(2) whether the finding of prosecution history estoppel completely bars the application of the
doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents is a judicially created concept with its Supreme Court origins in
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853). It is an equitable doctrine intended to prevent the pirating
of a patentee's invention in the absence of literal infringement. See Texas Instruments Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The doctrine reflects an
understanding that there is a balance between giving the public fair notice of an invention through
clear, particular, and precise patent claims and protecting the patentee from competitors who usurp
the essence of an invention by avoiding the literal language of the claim.
Much of the "modern contours" of the doctrine of equivalents was set out by the Supreme Court
over 50 years ago in Graver Tank and Manufaeturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605
(1950). Stating that the "essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on a patent,"
the Court reemphasized that "a patentee may invoke this doctrine . . . 'if [a device] performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result."' Id. at 608
(quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). In applying this doctrine,
'[a]n important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was." Id. at 609. The
doctrine of equivalents does not expand or broaden the scope of the claims of a patent. "The
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U.S. patent protection has been narrowed. For example, patents on pioneering
inventions in important new technologies, which have traditionally been afforded a
broad scope of protection, may now receive much less protection depending upon the
5
patent's prosecution history.
Ironically, a narrower scope of patent protection has always been a major
concern that American commentators have expressed about the Japanese patent
system. 6 Indeed, historically, Japan did not recognize a doctrine of equivalents. 7 In
a sense, then, the Festo decision might represent a sort of "Japanification" of the
American patent system. 8 It is therefore helpful to briefly explore the relationship
between the Japanese patent system, with its narrow scope of patent protection, and
the development of Japanese industry.
While both American and Japanese patent law aim to promote "innovation," the
two patent systems have different conceptions of the term. The American patent

claims-i.e., the scope of patent protection as defined by the claims-remain the same and
application of the doctrine expands the right to exclude to 'equivalents' of what is claimed." Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Much controversy surrounds the doctrine, with commentators arguing for its abolishment or
limitation. See Clarence J. Fleming, The Doctrine of Equivalents-Should it be Available in the
Absence of Copying?, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 233, 237 (1994). The doctrine arguably
contradicts the statutory requirement that the patentee disclose his invention in "full, clear, concise,
and exact terms." 35 U.S.C. § 112
1. But see Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 25 (rejecting the
argument that doctrine

of equivalents

is

inconsistent with the statutory requirement

that a

patentee specifically "claim" the invention covered by a patent). Indeed, despite reaffirming the
continued existence of the doctrine in 1997, Justice Thomas, in Warner-Jenkinson, admitted that
"[t]here can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the
definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement." Warner-Jonkinson,
520 U.S. at 33.
, Prosecution history estoppel, or file wrapper estoppel, serves as a limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents by precluding a patentee from recapturing what was relinquished through claim
amendments and arguments during the prosecution of the patent application. Therefore, "the
doctrine of equivalents is subservient to prosecution history estoppel." Autogiro Co. v. United
States, 181 Ct. Cl. 55, 67 (1967). "The logic of prosecution history estoppel is that the patentee,
during prosecution, has created a record that fairly notifies the public that the patentee has
surrendered the right to claim particular matter as within the reach of the patent." Festo, 234 F.3d

at 564-65.
For a more detailed discussion of prosecution history and the doctrine of equivalents before
Fes to, see Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court'
Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection-Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 45-46 (1998).
6 See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The JapanesePatentSystem and US. Innovators, 29 INT'L L. &
POL. 177 (1996-97); Patent Protection in Japan, 15 EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP. 9, 11 (Oct. 1993)
(the first article of a series of three based on a report by the U.S. General Accounting Offices on U.S.
companies patent experiences in Japan); Toshiko Takenaka, Japan:The Role of the Japanese Patent
System in Japanese Industry, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 25, 29 (1994).
7 See Toshiko Takenaka, Interpreting Patent Claims: The United States, Germany, and
Japan, 17 IIC STUD.: STUD. IN INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 243 (1995). Professor Takenaka's
comparative study is the authoritative literature on the interpretation of U.S., German, and
Japanese patent claims.
On February 24, 1998, the Supreme Court of Japan finally recognized the presence of the
doctrine of equivalents under the Japanese Patent System. See Tsubakimoto Seiko Co. Ltd. v. THK
K.K., (1994) (o) 1083 (Feb. 24, 1998) (translation by Chris T. Mizumoto), available at
http://okuyama.com/doe.html.
S This observation arises from discussions with Steven E. Feldman.
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system, under the U.S. Constitution, emphasizes the invention by focusing on the
inventor's exclusive rights.9 Thus, on a spectrum from imitation to invention, the
American patent system might place "innovation" more towards the invention end
than the imitation end of the spectrum. In contrast, Article 1 of Japan's Patent Law
makes no mention of the inventor's rights. It simply states that its goal is to promote
industrial development by encouraging the protection and exploitation of
inventions. 10 Japan's conception of "innovation" might therefore be placed more
towards the imitation end and to the left of the American conception.
Indeed, the history of Japanese industry in the last fifty years reveals that
Japanese innovation has focused on developments in applied technology rather than
inventions in basic technology.
Past studies have indicated that Japanese industry
has great advantages in developing improvements and innovations based on external
inventions, but not internal inventions.1 2 These external inventions were basic
technologies imported from Western countries, such as the United States. Japanese
companies would improve and modify these technologies and apply them to products
very quickly. By importing and imitating basic Western technologies, Japan could
concentrate on improving related process technologies by reducing cost, increasing
quality, and investing heavily in equipment. This practice has enabled Japan to
13
catch up to, if not exceed, the technological levels of Western countries.
The Japanese focus on improvement through imitation rather than invention is
quite consistent with the narrow scope of patent protection afforded to Japanese
technology. The result of such narrow protection is that Japanese companies have
developed the strategy of surrounding a core technology patent, likely owned by
another inventor, with many narrow, minor improvement patents and in essence,
14
holding "hostage" the core patent by charging a toll for use of the improvements.
This tactic of "patent flooding" has generated much criticism from U.S. commentators
who attribute part of the problem to attempts by Japanese companies to counter the

Under Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress shall have the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Time to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,
cl. 8. (emphasis added).
10 "The purpose of this Law shall be to encourage inventions by promoting their protection and
utilization so as to contribute to the development of industry." Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No.
121 of 1959, as last amended May 6, 1998, art. 1 (Japan) (emphasis added). Translation of Tokkyo
Ho is available at the Japan Patent Office Homepage, http://www.jpo-miti.go.jp.
See also
Takenaka, supra note 7, at 25.
11See Takenaka, supra note 7, at 25.
12 See Edwin Mansfield, IndustrialInnovation in Japan and the United States, 241 SCIENCE
1769 (Sep. 30, 1988). Mansfield observes that one reason for this phenomenon is that Japanese
companies emphasize process engineering and efficient manufacturing by allocating more resources
in tooling, manufacturing equipment, and facilities, thereby leading to innovation in the form of
improvements on existing technologies. In contrast, U.S. companies allocate more resources in
marketing start-up leading to innovations in the form of basic technological inventions.
13 See Kitch, supra note 6, at 178 ("The Japanese licensee enters the market, and although its
initial efforts may be weak, its learns from experience, masters the technology, and becomes an
important international competitor in subsequent generations of the technology."); Kazuo Nomura,
The Context for Innovation in Japan, 17 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 51 (1989).
11See Thomas J. Klitgaard, The Context for Innovation in Japan:Comparative Aspects and
Some PracticalComments, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 55 (1995).
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effect of the narrow patent protection. 15 However, the culture of the "keiretsu"
system in Japan has prevented such patent flooding from becoming a hindrance to
Japanese business and technology development. 16 Indeed, under the keiretsu
system, Japanese companies have embraced the development of collective rights
organizations ("CROs") to foster cooperation and minimize business conflicts. As
17
such, patent pooling arrangements are standard corporate practice in Japan.
All the foregoing suggest that, in light of Festo and the "Japanification" of the
American patent system, patent pooling will also become an increasingly important
practice in the United States. Furthermore, the recent approvals of patent pool
arrangements for MPEG-218 and DVD1 9 technology by the United States Department
of Justice also suggest a more tolerant antitrust treatment of such pooling

15See, e.g., Jeffrey A Wolfson, Note, PatentFlooding in the Japanese Patent Office: Methods
for Reducing PatentFloodingand ObtainingEffective Patent Protection,27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 531, 541 (1994).
16 "Keiretsu" describes the unique organization of Japan's economy and literally means
'affiliation." A keiretsu is a group of companies linked together by "close and enduring bonds that
transcend ties of legal contract or short-term market considerations." DANIEL I. OKIMOTO, REGIME
OF CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN JAPAN'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES:
LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 35, 58 (Hugh Patrick ed., 1986). The cooperation
provided by the keiretsu system enables "already powerful companies, banks, and insurance firms
[to combine] into even more powerful groups that can dominate markets in good times, drive out
competition in bad times, and provide protection from the kind of hostile takeovers and stockholder
demands for quick profits that plague many American industries." Paul Blustein, Japan's Corporate
Connections Create Challenge for US Businesses, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1991, at Al (first part of a
two-part series on the Japanese keiretsu); see also Paul Blustein, Inside Japan Inc.: Cozy Ties
FosterPoliticalFriction,WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1991, at Al.
17Sung and Pelto observe that:
[D]e facto patent pooling arrangements represent standard corporate practice in
Japan, where companies favor acquisition of extensive patent portfolios as a
defensive measure against litigation and other business conflicts. Patent pools
have particular advantage in Japan in view of the traditionally narrow scope of
protection granted in their individual patents and the consequentially greater
number of patents in a given technology, when compares with the United States.
These aspects, in conjunction with cultural norms, motivate Japanese
corporations to commit their respective patent portfolios to pooling arrangements
to obtain less costly access to vital technology as well as an added measure of
security against competitor conflicts.
Lawrence M. Sung & Don J. Pelto, GreaterPredictabilityMa, Result in Patent Pools, NAT. L.J.,
June 22, 1998, at C2; see also David S. Taylor, Note, The Sinking of the United States Electronic
Industry Within JapanesePatent Pools, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 181, 187 (1992) ("The
keiretsu system of the Japanese electronics industry encourages cartelization and the formation of
agreement among competitors.").
18 See Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to
Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/busreview/1170.htm [hereinafter MPEG-2 Letter].
19 See Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Garrard R.
Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (December 16, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/busreview/2121.htm [hereinafter Sony Review Letter]; Business Review Letter from Joel
Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison (June 10, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm
[hereinafter Toshiba Review Letter].
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arrangements than demonstrated in the past. 20 This Article focuses on the effect of
patent pooling on highly standardized industries, and, in particular, the software
industry. 2 1 It suggests that the Japanification of the U.S. patent system may lead to
the Japanification of the U.S. software industry. Specifically, while patent pooling
arrangements may lead to more efficient development of standardized software, they
will also likely lead to a further retardation of research and invention in the
standards market by increasing the incentive to create standards-compliant
software. 22 Part II reviews the economic effects of standardization in the software
industry. Part III reaffirms the patentability of software and explores the debate
concerning open and proprietary standards. It concludes that regardless of whether
a standard is open, patent pools that control access to the standard may still arise
because competitors will simply acquire patents surrounding the landscape of the
open standard. Part IV examines the effect of patent pooling on software innovation.
This section lays out the argument that patent pooling will exacerbate the
retardation of innovation already caused by standardization. It also explores the
structure of the MPEG-2 patent pool and challenges the importance of "essentiality"
of patents to the MPEG-2 standard as defined by the Department of Justice in its
approval of the pool.

II. NETWORK EFFECTS AND STANDARDIZATION IN THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
A. Network ExternalitiesandEffects
The software market is widely regarded as a market that exhibits network
externalities. 23 The "network" created by software is not an actual physical network,
like the telephone network or Internet, but rather a virtual network that increases
the value of the software to a consumer when there are additional users of the
software. 24 Because this increased value is directly attributable to the number of
software users and is separate from the inherent value of the software itself, it is
known as a network externality.25

That is, network externalities arise when the

20 See, e.g., Andrea C. Brunetti, Wading into Patent Pools, INTELLECTUAL PROP., Nov. 1997,
available at http://www.ipmag.com/brunetti.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2001).
21 While this Article focuses on the software industry, its conclusions are likely applicable to
other highly standardized industries.
22 Even in the absence of patent pooling, retardation of innovation in standardized industries is
a well-recognized phenomenon. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Standardizationand IntellectualProperty,
30 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 37 (1989).
23 See Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998); Mark Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet StandardizationProblem, 28
CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1996); M. Joseph Hinshaw, The Role of Standardization and
Interoperabilityin Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 4 COMM. L. & POLICY 299, 305-06
(1999).
24 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 23, at 491.
25 The software market exhibits a "weak' form of network externalities because a software
product can have inherent value (i.e., it can be used) to a consumer regardless of whether other
persons own or use the product. In contrast, examples of the "strong" form of network externalities
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value that existing users get from a network increases when another user joins the
network. 26 For example, a consumer may choose Microsoft® Word over WordPerfect®
because the larger network of Word users will provide the consumer the ability to
easily exchange documents with others. 27 Similarly, corporations may choose Word
because it is easier to find employees who are trained to use it.28 Thus, despite the
technical similarities between the two products, the network externalities provided
29
by Word increase its value over WordPerfect®.
In addition to the direct effects of network externalities, software markets also
30
display secondary effects that are also attributed to its network characteristics.
Specifically, the demand in the aftermarket for complementary goods increases when
additional users join the virtual network of a software product. 31 For example, the
Microsoft Windows* operating system is a software product that has more than 90
percent market share in the desktop market. 32 Therefore, software developers tend
to produce application programs (i.e., complementary goods) designed for the
Windows® operating system. Such an increase in application programs reinforces the
popularity and market strength of the Windows® operating system. 33 As evidenced
by the monopoly position of the Windows® operating system, this reinforcement
phenomenon, known as the positive feedback effect, can be quite strong and suggests
34
the tendency of a network market to move towards a single network.
As a result of the foregoing effects, network markets can suffer from natural
market failures or pathologies. 35 Several commentators have recognized the presence
are telephone networks and the Internet, in which the value of using a telephone or an Internet
connection is so heavily dependent on the adoption by others. See Lemley, supra note 23, at 1045.
26 Liebowitz and Margolis point out that for some network markets, once a critical mass is
achieved, the marginal utility of an additional user joining the network is zero. This idea of
inframarginal externality suggests that in instances where the marginal benefits of network size are
exhausted, multiple networks can coexist. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Network
Externalhty:An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 140 (1994).
27 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 1045.
28 Id.
29 It is true, of course, that Microsoft
Word and WordPerfect both have conversion and
compatibility features. However, the assumption, for the purposes of this observation, is that the
cost of the conversion technology, due to its imprecision and inconvenience, coupled with the
network externalities of using Word, convince the consumer to purchase Word. Other factors
important to the decision making process such as cost and company reputation are also momentarily
set aside.
'30Some commentators simply describe these effects as "indirect" network externalities. See,
e.g., David S. Evans & Bernard J. Reddy, Some Economic Aspects of Standard in Network
Industries and their Relevance to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 1 INTELL. PROP.
ANTITRUST 177, 185 (1996).
31 See id. at 184; Hinshaw, supra note 23, at 306; Lemley & McGowan, supranote 23, at 494.
'32 Competition in the
Network Market: The Microsoft Challenge 8, available at
http://www.siia.net/sharedcontent/govt/issues/compete/servcomp.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2001).
33 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 23, at 491.
'3 See Evans & Reddy, supranote 30, at 186. As Lemley and McGowan point out, the strength
of such secondary network effects will vary depending on the type of software in question. For
example, such effects will be much stronger for operating system software than for more isolated
standalone applications. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 23, at 492. But see Liebowitz &
Margolis, supra note 26, at 140.
35 Simple network theory teaches that even without consideration of positive feedback effects,
network markets are under-utilized from a social perspective. That is, even if a network product is
competitively priced at cost, a consumer will only purchase such products where his private
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of a tipping effect in network markets.3 6 Tipping is the natural tendency of a single
product to pull away from its competition once it has gained an initial edge due to
network effects. This tipping effect can occur quite rapidly and stems, in part, from
consumers' inclinations to gravitate towards the product that they expect will become
dominant.3 7 Once consumers commit resources to a chosen product, they become
disinclined to move to competing products because of substantial levels of collective
38
inertia, switching costs and other network lock-in effects.

B. De FactoStandards
The positive feedback effect and network externalities coupled with tipping and
lock-in effects (collectively referred to as "network effects") suggest that software
companies will compete vigorously to have their product emerge as the single
dominant "de facto" standard around which consumers will choose to develop a
virtual network. 39 Indeed, once a product becomes a de facto standard, it is quite
40
difficult to dislodge because of the cyclical durability it gains from network effects.
Thus, because of the "all or nothing" nature of this de facto standards competition,
the winner will emerge holding an extremely profitable market position. Each
competitor in the de facto standards competition anticipates that it will win and,
therefore, reap returns not only from the software product itself, but also from the
benefits of the virtual network. As a result, all competitors are willing to engage in

marginal benefit exceeds that cost. However, due to network externalities, the social marginal
benefit of having the consumer purchase the product is greater than his private marginal benefit
because of the benefits that accrue to others already in the network. Thus, because the social
marginal benefits exceed private marginal benefits, the equilibrium network size will be inefficient
since it is smaller than the socially optimal network size. When positive feedback effects are
considered, the aggregation of even small losses at the individual level can result in significant
social welfare losses. See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects,
8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 96 (1994).
36 Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in
Standardization,8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 118 (1996); Evans & Reddy, supra note 30, at 186; Lemley,
supra note 23, at 1049; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 23, at 496.
'37Besen & Farrell, supra note 36, at 118; Lemley, supranote 23, at 1050.
'38For example, after consumers are trained to use a particular software product, they are more
reluctant to switch to a new product. Similarly, once consumers invest in a software product
through which they create documents and data readable only by that product, they are reluctant to
switch to a new product. See Lemley, supra note 23, at 1050.
39 But see Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 26, at 140 (suggesting that multiple networks can
coexist in markets that exhibit inframarginal externalities).
40 The underlying assumption in the de facto standards competition model is that the products
introduced by competitors are incompatible. That is, each firm prefers to lose a battle to become the
industry standard than to make its product compatible with other firms' products. This de facto
standards competition is likely to occur where: (1) firms are symmetric in their market and
technology positions; (2) the standards competition does not greatly delay the adoption of technology
by consumers; and (3) if competition at the would-be compatible products level (as opposed to the
incompatible standards level) would be likely to dissipate potential industry profits. See Besen &
Farrell, supra note 36, at 122; Hinshaw, supra note 23, at 304. For more on compatibility decisions,
see generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 Am. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
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more competitive strategies and tactics than they otherwise would. 41 However, such
fierce competition can greatly dissipate a large proportion of the potential market
gain, because only a single winner emerges. 42 Furthermore, as discussed below, once
the winner emerges, natural pathologies in the dynamics of the virtual network
43
become apparent.
Network theory teaches that a firm should price a de facto standard product as
low as possible to allow widespread adoption of the standard. The reason is that
every potential user that joins the network not only brings benefits to himself, but
also brings benefits to everyone else in the network. However, if what emerges from
de facto standards competition is a single winner with great market power, then that
winner will maximize revenue by setting monopolistic prices above competitive
prices. The result is that would-be consumers are excluded from the network,
creating a social deadweight loss. 44 This inefficiency is compounded by the possibility
that a technically inferior product can easily emerge as the winner in a standards
45
competition due to aggressive marketing strategies that lead to the tipping effect.
Once a technically inferior product becomes the de facto standard, the network
effects make it extremely difficult for a superior product to challenge its market
position. Indeed, even if consumers would be better off switching to the new
standard, collective action problems or excess inertia may make it difficult to move to
that new standard. 46 In fact, Farrell and Saloner show that in the absence of perfect
information, consumers may even unanimously favor a change to a new technology
but still never make the switch because no single consumer is sufficiently motivated
to start a bandwagon rolling effect to overcome the current network effects. 47 Excess

41 Examples of such strategies and tactics are: (1) penetration pricing; (2) attracting suppliers
of complements; (3) product pre-announcements; (4) puffery; and (5) price commitments. See Besen
& Farrell, supra note 36, at 122-24; Evans and Reddy, supra note 30, at 192. Some of these
strategies are ineffective unless the technology is proprietary. For example, a firm will not engage
in penetration pricing unless their technology is protected by property rights, because it would not
be able to recoup its losses because competitors may flood the market with compatible goods. See
Evans & Reddy, supra note 30, at 193; Farrell, supranote 22, at 43.
42 See Besen & Farrell, supra note 36, at 120.
13 But see Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 26, at 133 (suggesting that network externalities
as market failures are theoretically fragile and empirically undocumented).
4 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 23, at 515-16.
4 See Besen & Farrell, supra note 36, at 118; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 23, at 497;
Farrell, supra note 22, at 40.
416
The classic example of excess inertia is the standard QWERTY typewriter keyboard that is
used to this day. Many have argued that the QWERTY keyboard is inferior to alternatives such as
the Dvorak keyboard, which failed to catch on. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of
QWERTY 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985). But see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, The Fable of
the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990). Farrell and Saloner describe and model the excess inertia
problem in their influential 1985 article. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibiity, andInnovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985).
17 See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 46, at 72. Alternatively, Katz and Shapiro discuss and
model an effect called "insufficient friction," which is the opposite of excess inertia. They show that
under certain circumstances, excess inertia cannot arise. Rather, firms will introduce and
consumers will adopt a new incompatible technology even if it does not contribute to total social
surplus. One reason for this effect is that adopters of the new technology ignore the fact that by
choosing the old technology, they would provide network benefits to users of the existing technology.
Instead, by choosing a new technology, these new adopters may worsen industry performance by
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inertia inevitably leads to the issue of whether network effects retard innovation,
which is discussed in a later section.
However, regardless of whether network effects retard innovation, it is clear
that a market driven de facto standards competition in a network industry can lead
to undesirable social inefficiencies, particularly if the winning product is proprietary.
As discussed previously, aggressive de facto standards competition between firms can
lead to the dissipation of industry gain since only a single winner emerges.
Furthermore, the winner will set prices at monopolistic levels in order to maximize
profits, leading to an under-utilization of the network that harms both current
consumers and would-be consumers.

C. FormalStandardSetting Organizations
One solution that addresses these inefficiencies is to impose an interoperable
standard that is accessible to all competitors. 48 That is, if firms explicitly or
implicitly agree to make their products compatible through standardization,
competition among firms will shift from competing at the de facto standards level
(known as inter-technology competition) to competing at the compatible products
level (known to as intra-technologycompetition). Since intra-technology competition
does not have same "all or nothing" flavor that inter-technology competition has due
to the tipping effect, intra-technology competition tends to lessen the dissipation of
industry profits due to competition. 49 Furthermore, intra-technology competition also
tends to lessen the probability that a single winner will control the network and thus
price monopolistically. Having multiple firms participating within a standard means
that those companies can compete to offer products incorporating the standard,
50
thereby expanding output, lowering prices, and encouraging interchangeability.
Perhaps the best way to impose an interoperable standard on a network
industry is through a group standard setting process by a private industry
organization. 51 The group standard setting process can be much faster than the de
stranding customers who own the older technology. Furthermore, Katz and Shapiro demonstrate
that firms with new incompatible technologies have private incentives to introduce their products
earlierthan would be socially desirable. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, ProductIntroduction
with Network Externalities,40 J. INDUS. ECON. 55 (1992).
1 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 1060.
49 According to Besen and Farrell, there is no general answer to the question of whether firms
will prefer competition for potentially enormous prices under inter-technology competition, or the
more conventional competition that occurs in an intra-technology context. See Besen & Farrell,
supra note 36, at 120.
5o See goenerallyJames J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-SettingConsortia, Antitrust, and
High-Teehnology Industries,64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247 (1995); Lemley, supra note 23 at 1064-65.
51 There are at least two other solutions to imposing an interoperable standard. One solution
is to preclude the winning firm of inter-technology competition from enforcing its proprietary rights
in the standard. The difficulty with this solution is to ensure that the winning firm still has
adequate incentives to develop and bring the product to market without proprietary rights. The
second solution is to have the government set a standard and compel industry participants to adopt
the standard. The difficulties with this solution are that: (1) government entities are likely not the
most qualified entities to be setting industry standards; (2) government-set standards may prove too
durable despite being ill-conceived; (3) government action may deter investment and reduce
incentives to innovate; (4) government set standards are less likely to evolve with time and more
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facto standardization arising from inter-technology competition. 52 One reason for
this is that the establishment of a standard through member cooperation avoids the
duplicative efforts present in inter-technology competition. 53 Another reason is that
the endorsement of a standard by an industry group can instill confidence in that
standard, leading to its quicker adoption by manufacturers and producers. 54 As long
as members of the private standard-setting group have enough market share, the
adoption of the standard will have enough momentum to create network benefits to
consumers. 55 Unlike other alternatives, such as government-controlled standard
setting, private standard-setting organizations are less likely to choose an inefficient
standard. 56 Multiple members of a standard-setting group can combine their
57
expertise to overcome information problems and offer a better-developed standard.
Furthermore, such group standards are more likely to technically evolve with time
58
rather than stagnate.
However, there are also problems associated with private standard setting. For
example, while a group standard may evolve with time, it must also remain
backwards compatible with its older versions so as not to strand users who do not
immediately adopt the new version of the standard. 59 For example, the current
Internet protocol is known as Internet Protocol version 4 ("IPv4").6 The Internet
Engineering Task Force ("IETF"), an Internet standards-setting organization, has
61
developed a new protocol Internet Protocol version 6 ("IPv6") to replace IPv4.
However, because of the need to accommodate current Internet users during the
transition from IPv4 to IPv6, IPv6 is arguably bogged down from the need to be
backwards compatible with IPv4. 62

Furthermore, such a formal standard-setting

process can also be time consuming due to the difficulty of achieving agreement
among members of the standard-setting organization, each of whom has a vested
interest in its own technologies. 63 In contrast to de facto standardization, where
inter-technology competition encourages early action by competitors, the formal
64
standard-setting process is less likely to reach an outcome before a given deadline.

likely to stagnate; and (5) government agencies are influences by powerful private interest groups.

See Lemley, supra note 23, at 1059-65.
52 See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Coordination Through Committees and Markets, 19
RAND J. ECON. 235, 239 (1988); Marcus Maher, An Analysis of Internet Standardization, 3 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 5, 26 (1998).
)3 See Maher, supra note 52, 26.
54

See id.

See Lemley, supra note 23, at 1059-65.
6 See id.
S7 See Maher, supra note 52, 26.
58 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 1059-65.
9 See id.

6OSee Internet Protocol:DARPA InternetProgramProtocolSpecification, RFC 791 (Jon Postel
ed., Sept. 1981), available at http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc791.html.
61 See Rob Glenn et al., Project: IPv6 Technology, available at http://snad.ncsl.nist.gov/antproposals/proj-ipv6/proj-ipv6.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
62 See Maher, supra note 52,
81.
63See Farrell, supra note 22, at 40.
64 See Garth & Saloner, supra note 52, at 239. However, despite the formal standard setting
process' potential to languish before the deadline, Garth and Saloner, factoring in the importance of
speed, still find that the formal standard is better than the de facto standard because the formal
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Indeed, the standard that is ultimately adopted will certainly disadvantage certain
subgroups of existing competitors whose technologies are not adopted into the
standard. 65 As a result of the time-consuming process, the agreed-upon standard
must often be forward-looking, predicting how consumers will use the technology to
prevent it from being out-of-date even before it is brought to market. 66 Finally,
private-setting groups can be susceptible to capture by influential or powerful
67
members.
Moreover, the consideration of strong intellectual property rights, such as
68
patents, can have a profound influence on industry standard-setting organizations.
Because strong intellectual property rights increase a participating member's vested
interests in having its patented technology adopted into a proposed standard, such
69
rights can have the tendency to retard the formal standard- setting process.
Additionally, as in the de facto standards context, strong intellectual property rights
can also prevent the optimal adoption of the formal standard by consumers. That is,
the owner of a patent that is part of a formal standard will charge a monopolistic
price for its use thereby preventing certain consumers who would otherwise have
used the standard from using it.70 Patent owners always have the choice to license
their technology at little or no cost to facilitate standardization process to make the
standard "open" rather than "sponsored."71 However, they may not necessarily do so,
particularly if their technology is considered to be an integral part of the proposed
standard.7 2 Indeed, if standard-setting organizations insist on adopting patent-free
standards, patent-owning members of the standard-setting group may have a
perverse incentive to engage in improper capture of the standard. For example, in
1992, the Video Electronics Standards Association ("VESA") approved and adopted
the VL-bus design standard for carrying information between a computer's central
processing unit and the computer's peripheral devices. As a member of the VESA,
Dell Computer Corporation certified that practicing the standard did not infringe
Dell's patents. Nevertheless, eight months later, after the VL-bus had become
established as a successful standard, Dell asserted a patent against other VESA
members for using the VL-bus standard. As a result, the Federal Trade Commission
issued a complaint alleging that Dell had engaged in acts and practices that
unreasonably restrained competition.73 Similarly, more recently in 1999, Microsoft
process has much better coordination and causes fewer errors in the final standard. See id. at 239
40.
6 See Anton & Yao, supra note 50, at 247.
6 See Farrell, supranote 22, at 40-41.
67 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 23, at 517.
68 "Strong" intellectual property rights, as used in this paper, means that the owner of the right
can exclude others from using the invention, or can charge a fee to use it. See Farrell, supra note
22, at 45.
6 Id. at 44.
70 See id. at 46.
71 See id. at 42.
72

See id. at 43.

See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). However, Commissioner Mary L.
Azcuenaga, in a dissenting statement, noted that:
Nothing in the limited information available to the Commission suggests that Dell
had any greater role in the development and promulgation of the VESA VL-bus
standard than that described in the minimal factual allegations in the complaint.
For example, the complaint does not allege that Dell proposed or sponsored the
73
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Corporation, a member of the World Wide Web Consortium, a nonprofit group
working to standardize the Web, created great controversy when it received a patent
covering a fundamental Web technology adopted by the Consortium without
informing the other members before the technology was adopted as a standard by the
Consortium.74

Nevertheless, concerns that patents are harmful to formal standard setting, as
discussed above, may be exaggerated, particularly in an industry with network
effects such as software. As discussed in the next Part, despite the attraction of open
standards, the involvement of software patents in the standard setting process may
be inevitable and may ensure that the best technologies are adopted into standards
having great durability due to network effects.

III. THE EFFECT OF SOFTWARE PATENTS ON OPEN STANDARDS
The issue of software patentability has a fascinating history, with both the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") and the courts struggling to grasp the concept
of software and its proper place in the patent system. Today, however, the PTO and
the courts both embrace the notion that software-related inventions are no different
than any other inventions with respect to patentability. Indeed, it is estimated that
the PTO currently issues more than 20,000 software-related patents a year.7 5 This
Part first provides a brief introduction to the patent system as a whole. It then
details the interesting development and the current trends regarding software
patents. Finally, the Part maintains that, in light of current legal trends regarding
software patents, contrary to certain popular conceptions, such patents can be helpful
in producing the best results in software standardization. Furthermore, regardless of
whether a software standard itself is open, software patent pools that ultimately
control access to the standard may still arise because competitors will simply acquire
software patents that surround the landscape of the open standard.

standard, that Dell urged others to vote for the standard, that Dell employees
participated in drafting the standard, that Dell employees were present, in person
or online, during the committee drafting sessions, that Dell steered the VESA
committee toward adopting a standard that incorporated Dell technology, or that
Dell had any hand whatsoever in shaping the standard.
Id. Nevertheless, a settlement agreement was entered in which Dell agreed to cease
and desist from asserting its patent. See In re Dell Computer Corp., No. 931-0095
(F.T.C. 1996).
74 However, Microsoft did ultimately say that its failure to disclose the patent application was
inadvertent and that it would freely license the patent. See Teresa Riordan, Microsoft Moves
Sparks Controversy Over Web Standards, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB (Feb. 22, 1999), at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/02/biztech/articles/1.
75 In 1998, Greg Aharonian reported that the PTO issued 17,500 software-related patents and
estimated that 1999 would see more than 22,500 issued software-related patents. This 1999
estimate is seventeen times more than number of software related patents issued(1300) nine years
earlier in 1990, and almost fifteen percent of the total amount of patents issued in 1999 (159,166).
See PATNEWS: 17,500 software patents to issue in 1998, INTERNET PATENT NEWS SERVICE (Greg
Aharonian ed.), Oct. 18, 1998; A Patent and Trademark Review: Century of American Invention,
Fiseal Year 1999 (U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/annual/1999/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
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A. Background on the PatentSystem
The federal government derives its power to grant patents under Article I,
section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the
power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 76 The patent system promotes this progress by offering a right of
exclusion to inventors in order to foster innovation by rewarding their time, research,
development, and effort. In return for this right of exclusion, inventors are required
to disclose their invention to the public by providing a full and clear description of the
invention that is sufficient enough to enable any person skilled in the field of the
invention to read the description, and thereafter make and use the invention.7 7 Such
disclosure stimulates further innovation, permits the public to practice the invention
once the patent expires, and assures that ideas in the public domain remain there for
the free use of the public. 7 8 The patent system thus recognizes the need to balance
79
the rights of the inventor against the dissemination of information to the public.
The present Patent Act, which was enacted in 1952, is codified in Title 35 of the
United States Code.8 0 In order to be granted a patent, an inventor must demonstrate
that the invention is novel,81 non-obvious, 82 and useful.8 3 However,
a patent need not
necessarily be an original work nor reveal any "flash of genius." 8 4 Indeed, a patent
may simply disclose a small improvement over a known technology, a novel
combination of well-known elements, or even a new use for an old invention.8 5 The
inventor must prepare and submit a patent application to the PTO.8 6 An examiner at
the PTO then conducts a search of past patents and relevant technical literature
(known as "prior art") to determine whether the invention is indeed novel, nonobvious, and useful.8 7 Often, an inventor may need to amend his original application,

76U.S. CONST. art. I,

§

8, cl. 8.

77

See 35 U.S.C. § 112

78

See Aronson v. Quick Point Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,

1 (1994).

416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
79 Soo Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("From their
inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary
to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.").
80 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
81See id. § 102.
82 See id. § 103.

83 See

id.§ 101.
See id. § 103 ("Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made."); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) ('It also seems apparent that
84

Congress intended ... § 103 to abolish the test it believed this Court announced in the controversial
phrase 'flash of creative genius,' used in Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91
(1941).").
85 See KENNETH NICHOLS, INVENTING
SOFTWARE: THE RISE OF "COMPUTER-RELATED
PATENTS," 10 (1998).
86 See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) ("In general . . [a]n application for patent shall be made, or
authorized to be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title, in writing to the
Director.")
87 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(1) (1999) ("On taking up an application for examination or a patent
in a reexamination proceeding, the examiner shall make a thorough study thereof and shall make a
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sometimes narrowing the scope of the invention to avoid overlap with prior art,
before a patent examiner will agree that the invention is indeed novel, non-obvious,
useful, and therefore patentable. However, if the PTO does ultimately grant a
patent, the owner of the patent has "the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling" the patented invention in the United States for a period
of twenty years.8 8 Once the patent is granted and issued, the owner can sue anyone
believed to be infringing the patent.8 9 Since patents have the attributes of personal
property, the owner can also assign, exclusively license, nonexclusively license, or
covenant not to sue others to practice the patent. 90
The Patent Act specifically enumerates the types of things that can be patented.
In particular, only a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter can be
patented. 91 These four express statutory categories (known as "statutory subject
92
matter") exhaust the possible subject matter that can be patentable inventions.
However, these categories are meant to be quite broad, and the Supreme Court has
repeatedly referred to legislative history, indicating that "Congress intended
93
statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man."'
There are, however, limitations to the broad interpretation of patentable subject
matter within these four categories. Specifically, laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas are excluded from patentable subject matter. 94 The reason for this
exclusion is that a patent granted on such discoveries or inventions would simply be
too powerful. That is, because these discoveries and inventions are the basic building
blocks for other inventions, a grant of exclusive rights would contravene the very
purpose of the patent system to promote technological progress. 95 Thus, as long as
the subject matter of an invention is not a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
abstract idea, the invention would more likely than not satisfy the statutory subject
96
matter requirement.
thorough investigation of the available prior art relating to the subject matter of the claimed
invention.").
88 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)(2) (1994).
89 See id. § 281 ("Apatentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.").
90 See id. § 261 ([P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.").
91 Soo id. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
92 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("[N]o patent is available for a
discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories
of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. s. 101.").
93 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Thus, it is improper to read into § 101 limitations as
to the subject matter that may be patented where the legislative history does not indicate that
Congress clearly intended such limitations.").
94See Diehr,450 U.S. at 185 ("This Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and every
discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent protection are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.").
95 See Gottschaulk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("Phenomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the
basic tools of scientific and technological work.").
96 Satisfying the statutory subject matter requirement, alone, is insufficient to fulfill the
requirements for receiving a patent. It is also necessary to satisfy the statutory requirements for
novelty, non-obviousness, and utility of the invention, as discussed earlier.

[1:274 2002]

Research Versus Development

B. The Development of Software -RelatedPatents
However, these statutory patent categories perhaps reflect an outdated
industrial-age conception of invention, and the rise of computer software inventions
in the information age left the PTO and the courts quite perplexed as to how to fit
such inventions within the statutory categories. 97
The 1960s saw incredible
advancements in computing and its viability as a commercial tool. 98

As such,

software designs and algorithms used to control computers became increasingly
important in the business context. However, the 1960s were also a time of aggressive
antitrust policy and enforcement in the United States, and, thus, patents were often
viewed as a way for big business to stifle competition. 99 Against this anti-patent
backdrop, the PTO, already ill-prepared to handle the growth of software -related
patent applications, knew that it was unlikely to receive federal funding to increase
its facilities to deal with software patent applications. 100 As a result, the PTO
adopted a policy of instructing its examiners to reject such software algorithms as
unpatentable subject matter.10 1 Understandably, these rejections resulted in patent
applicants appealing to the federal courts, and specifically, to the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals ("CCPA").
However, in contrast to the PTO, the CCPA,
unburdened by fiscal considerations, adopted a more tolerant attitude towards
software patents. In a line of software-related cases from 1969 to 1971, the CCPA
appeared to firmly embrace computer software as patentable subject matter.102

97 Statutory patentable subject matter has essentially remained the same since the first patent
statute was enacted in 1790. Under the 1790 Patent Act, patentable subject matter included "any
art, manufacture, engine, machine or device, or any invention or improvement upon." 1 Stat. 109,
111, § 4 (1790). In 1793, the act was repealed and replaced with a longer act largely attributed to
Thomas Jefferson. The 1793 Patent Act set forth the definition of what constitutes patentable
subject matter that is almost unchanged even today:
"any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter and any new and useful improvement on any art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter." 1 Stat. 318, 319, § 1 (1793). The term "art" in the definition
was eventually replaced by "process" in 1952, but this term is itself defined as a "process, art or
method." 35 U.S.C § 101.
98 For example, in 1964, Digital Equipment Corporation received its first patent for magnetic
core memory and by 1965, its PDP-8 computers were a great success. In 1968, Computer Science
Corporation became the first software company to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange and
IBM revenues approached seven-billion dollars. The 1960s also saw the invention of the mouse as
well as initial developments in ARPAnet, the grandfather to the Internet. See The Main Events in
the History of Computing, available at http://www.bozdoc.f2s.com/history.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2001).
99 See Gregory J. Maier & Robert C. Mattson, State Street Bank in the Context of the Software
PatentSaga, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 309 (1999).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 310.
102 See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971) ("It seems beyond question that the
machines-the computers-are in the technological field, are part of one of our best-known
technologies, and are in the 'useful arts.' . . . How can it be said that a process having no practical
value other than enhancing the internal operation of those machines is not likewise in the
technological or useful arts? We conclude that the Patent Office has put forth no sound reason why
the claims in this case should be held to be non-statutory."), rey'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972); In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742, 745 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("Appellant . .. intends the
claims to cover only the machine implementation of the process and not the mental implementation
thereof. If the appealed claims accomplish that intent .... he will .. .have overcome the § 101
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The CCPA cases represented a series of defeats for the understaffed PTO, and it
finally appealed its case to the Supreme Court in 1972.103 In its first software patent
case, Gottseha]k v. Benson, the Court held that an algorithm for converting binary
coded decimal (BCD) into pure binary numerals was not a process and therefore not
statutory subject matter. 10 4 In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that the
steps in the claimed algorithm could be performed by hand, and, therefore, the
invention was an unpatentable idea rather than a patentable process. 10 5 However,
the Court also indicated that its decision did not definitively preclude the possibility
of software patents. 10 6 The Court further suggested that Congress would have to
make a decision as to whether a new statutory category should be created for
software. 10 7 Despite its ambiguity, the PTO interpreted the Benson decision as a
victory over the CCPA, supporting its anti-software patent policy.108 While many
thought that Benson meant software was unpatentable, the issue continued to
generate great criticism and debate. 10 9 As a result, six years later, the Supreme
Court again took up the issue in Parkerv. Flook.110 In Flook, the inventor claimed a
rejection, since the machine-implemented process is clearly statutory."); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d
882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational
steps a statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C. 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in
consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of 'useful arts."'); In re
Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969) ([J]f a machine is programmed in a certain new and
unobvious way, it is physically different from the machine without that program; its memory
elements are differently arranged ....
If a new machine has not been invented, certainly a 'new
and useful improvement' of the unprogrammed machine has been, and Congress has said in 35
U.S.C. 101 that such improvements are statutory subject matter for a patent.").
103See Maier & Mattson, supra note 99, at 315.
104See Gottsehalk, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
105 See id. at 71-72.
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would
be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals
were patented in this case. The mathematical formula involved here has no
substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer,
which means that if the judgment below is affirms, the patent would wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithm itself.
Id.
10 See id. at 71 ("It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a
computer. We do not so hold.").
107 See id. at 72-73.
It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a
policy matter to which we are not competent to speak.
The President's
Commission on the Patent System rejected the proposal that these programs be
patentable ....
If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised
which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation
are needed, including hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which
those operating in this field entertain. The technological problems tendered in
the many briefs before us indicate to us that considered action by the Congress is
needed.
Id.
108 See Maier & Mattson, supra note 99, at 318.
109See id.; see also NICHOLS, supra note 85, at 16.
110437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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method for monitoring variables during a chemical conversion process and updating
a numerical value that determined whether an alarm would sound during the
conversion process.111 Like Benson, the claim included an algorithm for determining
the alarm value that could have been performed by hand. 112 However, unlike
Benson, the claim further included the additional step of actually updating the old
value with the new value in a computerized chemical conversion process (referred to
as "post-solution activity").113
Nevertheless, despite likely satisfying a literal
interpretation of the term "process," the Court refused to recognize the Flook claim as
a statutory process simply because it contained the simple additional step of using
the numerical value resulting from the algorithm in a physical process. 114 Thus, the
Court, following its reasoning in Benson, rejected the Flook invention as
unpatentable subject matter.11 5 Again, as it did in Benson, however, the Court
refused to assert that software should not be patentable and deferred to Congress to
make such a policy decision. 116 And again, Flook was seen as a victory for the PTO,
but, like Benson, did not definitively resolve the fundamental philosophical
117
differences between the PTO and CCPA concerning software.
Three years later, in 1981, the Supreme Court would issue its last opinion to
date on the software patent issue. With Ronald Reagan as President, the era of
aggressive antitrust enforcement effectively ended and technological innovation was
soon identified as an essential element on the road to the nation's economic
recovery.118 As such, the anti-patent sentiment was discarded and replaced with a

I Id. at 585.
112Id. at 586.
113 Id.
1 See id. at 590.
The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in
itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts
form over substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of postsolution activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem
would not have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent
application contained a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could

be usefully applied to existing surveying techniques. The concept of patentable
subject matter under §101 is not "like a nose of wax which may be turned and
twisted in any direction .
Id.
I'," See id. at 595 ("Very simply, our holding today is that a claim for an improved method of
calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.").
116 See id. at 595.
Neither the dearth of precedent, nor this decision, should therefore be interpreted
as reflecting a judgment that patent protection of certain novel and useful
computer programs will not promote the progress of science and the useful arts, or
that such protection is undesirable as a matter of policy. Difficult questions of
policy concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate for patent
protection and the form and duration of such protection can be answered by
Congress on the basis of current empirical data not equally available to this
tribunal.
Id.
117 See Maier & Mattson, supra note 99, at 320.
118 Id. at 321; see also THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A
HISTORY 1982-1990, at 8 (1991).

[1:274 2002]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

desire to improve an American court system regarded to be impeding innovation due
to lack of uniformity in the patent laws.119 Despite no changes in its composition,
even the Supreme Court seemed to embrace this change of attitude in Diamond v.
Diehr.120 Factually, Diehr was quite similar to Flook.121 The invention involved a
process for curing synthetic rubber. Similar to Flook, the computerized process in
Diehr continuously monitored variables during the curing and recalculated the cure
time by solving the well-known Arrhenius equation.1 22 However, the Diehr claims
went slightly further than Flook, including actual physical steps to automatically
open the rubber mold if the cure time had elapsed. 123 This slight distinction was
1 24
enough for the Court to hold that Diehr's claimed subject matter was patentable.
In doing so, the Court emphasized that courts "should not read into the patent laws
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed," thus recognizing
software as fitting within the traditional statutory categories of subject matter and
discarding its past view of software as a new category of subject matter.1 25 The Diehr
decision represented a symbolic shift by the Court away from the reluctance to
extend patent rights to unforeseen areas such as software as seen in Benson and
Flook, to embracing a new attitude that "anything under the sun that is made by
man," could be patentable subject matter.126
The Supreme Court's decision in Diehr paved the way for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the newly-formed national court of appeals
for patent matters that replaced the CCPA, to solidify the patentability of softwarerelated inventions in the United States. In a series of decisions in the 1990s, the
Federal Circuit continually whittled away the PTO's long-standing policy of rejecting
software-related inventions.1 27 As a result of the new Federal Circuit precedent, the
PTO changed its entire examination process for software-related inventions and

''9 The desire resulted in the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the
national court of appeals for all patent matters, in 1982. See THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982-1990, supra note 118, at 1-14.
120
121
122

450 U.S. 175 (1981); see Maier & Mattson, supranote 99, at 321.
See Diehr,450 U.S. at 187.
Id.at 179.

123 In contrast, the Flook claim included no such physical step, but simply used its calculated
number to update an alarm limit in memory.
121 See Diehr,450 U.S. at 188.
125 Id. at 182 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
126 See
127

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.

See In re Beauregard. 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ('[C]omputer programs

embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 and must be examined under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103."); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[A] computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable
subject matter, provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter meets all of the other
requirements of Title 35."); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ([T]he storage
of data in a memory physically alters the memory, and thus in some sense gives rise to a new
memory."); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that particular data
structures are statutory subject matter because, "more than mere abstraction .... data structures
are specific electrical or magnetic structural elements in a memory . . . that provide increased
efficiency in computer operation."); Arrythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d
1053, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that computer-performed operations that simply "transform a
particular input signal to a different output signal, in accordance with the internal structure of the
computer as configured by electronic instructions," are statutory subject matter.).
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issued its Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions ("PTO Guidelines") in 1996.128
The Federal Circuit's software jurisprudence culminated in its 1998 landmark
decision, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature FinancialGroup, Inc.,129 which
confirmed that software patents issued even prior to the PTO Guidelines would be
enforced by the courts in litigation. In State Street Bank, the Federal Circuit
dramatically shifted the subject matter analysis with regard to software related
inventions away from prior concerns with mathematical algorithms and physical
requirements. 130 It developed a new "practical utility" test as to whether a software
claim was statutory subject matter by simply assessing whether it produced "a
useful, concrete, and tangible result."131 One year later, in AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc.,132 the Federal Circuit extended its State Street decision,
which had involved a system claim, to method claims. The AT&Tcourt held that a
method claim need not physically transform the subject matter of the invention from
one form to another. 133 Rather, the inquiry is whether the mathematical algorithm
used in the method is applied in a practical manner to produce a useful result. 134 As

such, the Federal Circuit recognized that software-related inventions were no
different than other inventions with regard to using principles of novelty, nonobviousness and utility to determine patentability.

C. PatentedFormalSoftware Standards
As a result of the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that software algorithms
that are part of a formal standard can indeed be patented. 135 Indeed, the computer
industry has driven much of the growth of formal standardization due to its rapid
growth of the industry, which has led to increased fragmentation and cries for
coordination. 136
As such, many of the traditional software standard-setting
organizations have adopted specific policies regarding patents and formal standards.
For example, the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI") has an express
policy for consideration of candidate standards that may require the use of a

128 See Examination Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479
(Dep't Commerce Feb. 28, 1996).
129 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
130 See Indira Saladi, Computer Software: PatentableSubject Matter JurisprudenceComes of
Age, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 113, 133-137 (1999).
',3' State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
132 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1,3,3
Id. at 1358.
131Id. at 1360.
135While this article reaffirms the patentability of computer software inventions, it does not
take a position on whether the PTO has been too lax in its assessment of novelty and nonobviousness in granting such software patents. For more on this issue, see Greg Aharonian, Does
the Patent Office Respect the Software Community IEEE SOFTWARE, July/Aug., 1999, at 87-89;
Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); U.S.
Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, Patent Quality Controls Are Inadequate,
PTD-9977-7-0001 (1997).
136 See Garth & Saloner, supra note 52, at 236.
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patented invention. 137 The ANSI Patent Policy requires the possible patent holder to
sign a statement that the patent holder either: (1) does not hold and does not intend
holding any invention the use of which would be required for compliance with the
proposed standard; (2) will offer a patent license without compensation to applicants;
or (3) will offer a license to applicants under reasonable terms and conditions that
are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination. 13 8 Furthermore, ANSI has issued
guidelines for implementing its patent policy, emphasizing early disclosure of patent
rights and an early indication of a willingness to license. 139 The Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE") has a similar provision in its bylaws to
assure that a patent holder will license applicants under reasonable terms and
conditions.1 40 Similarly, the directives of the Joint Technical Committee 1 ("ISO/lEC
JTC 1") provide that the originator of a proposed standard shall notify the committee
of any patent rights that may cover the proposed standard.1 41 If the proposed
standard is accepted, the originator must obtain statements from patent holders that
they are willing to negotiate worldwide patent licenses on reasonable and
1 42
non-discriminatory terms and conditions.
However, more recent standard-setting organizations such as the Internet
Society ("ISOC")143 and the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C")144 that deal

137 ANSI is a nonprofit, privately-funded membership organization that coordinates the
development of U.S. voluntary national standards and is the U.S. member body to the International
Organization for Standardization ("ISO") and, via the United States National Committee ('USNC"),
the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC").
ANSI coordinates standards in all
industries, including safety and health, telecommunications, information processing, petroleum,
medical devices, etc. Some of the well-known computer-related standards sponsored by ANSI are:
(1) the famous ASCII character code (ANSI X3.4-1986); (2) the FORTRAN programming language
(ANSI X3.9-1978); (3) the COBOL programming language (ANSI X3.23-1985); (4) the BASIC
programming language (ANSI X3.113-1987); and (5) the C programming language (ANSI X3.1591989).
1,38See ANSI's Procedures for the Development and Coordination of American National
Standards, §§ 1.2.11.1-1.2.11.4 (January 2001), available at http://web.ansi.org/public/library/
stdproc/anspro.html.

139See Guidelines for Implementation of the ANSI Patent Policy: An Aid to Moro Efficient and

Effective Standards Development in Fields That May Involve Patented Technology, available at
http://web.ansi.org/public/library/guides/ppguide.html (last modified March 24, 2000).
140 See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, cl. 6 (2001), available at http:!
standards.ieee.org/guides/bylaws/index.html. IEEE-SA is the standards association for IEEE and is
responsible for encouraging, developing, and publishing IEEE standards. While ANSI is primarily
concerned with software, IEEE is primarily concerned with hardware. There are, however, some
well-known computer-related standards developed by IEEE, including (1) the PASCAL
programming language (IEEE 770-1983) and (2) the POSIX API for a standard OS/program
interface (IEEE 1003.1-1990).
"I See ISOIEC Directives Part 2: Methodology for the development of International
Standards 17 Annex A (1992, as amended by Amendment 1, 5/31/95), available at
http://isotc.iso.ch/livelink/livelink/fetci/2000/2123/SDSWEB/dir2.html.
The ISO/IEC JTC 1 is a
joint committee of the International Organization for Standardization ("ISO") and International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC") dealing with standardization in the field of information
technology. Some of the well-known computer related standards developed by ISO/IEC JTC 1
include the JPEG and MPEG standards for image and video compression, respectively.
142 Id.
143 Formed in 1992, the ISOC is the organizational home of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF"), the Internet Architecture Board ("IAB"), the Internet Engineering Steering Group
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specifically with the Internet standards have adopted differing attitudes concerning
patents. The 1SOC adopts an approach similar to the traditional standard-setting
bodies, encouraging disclosure and obtaining assurances of openly specified,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory licenses from patent holders. 145 Nevertheless,
the Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF"), the standards-developing body under
the ISOC, has considered developing less technically appealing standards, because
the ideal standard would be encumbered by a third-party patent. 146 Similarly, the
W3C has traditionally preferred open standards that are free from patents or can be
implemented on a royalty-free basis.

147

Indeed, the W3C explicitly states that

"whenever possible, technical decisions should be made unencumbered by intellectual
property right (IPR) claims."

148

In contrast, and perhaps due to their broader

experience, neither ANSI, IEEE, nor ISO/IEC JTC 1 expressly objects to standards
149
that include use of patented inventions.
As commentators have acknowledged, the goal of open standards and patent
protection of inventions need not necessarily be inconsistent. 150 Indeed, as most
standard-setting bodies seem to have recognized, patents are an important
consideration in the standard-setting process. First, on a practical level, the
procurement of patents can provide additional protection for a company if its
proposed standard is rejected by a standard-setting body, or if negotiations during a
standards-development process break down. Second, organizational policies that
disfavor adopting proposed standards that involve patents may create a perverse
effect for firms owning the best patented technologies to shy away from the formal
standards-setting process, opting to commit resources to the less efficient de facto
standard route. However, if a sub-optimal software standard without the best
patented technologies is promoted by a standard-setting body and gains momentum
in industry due to network effects, only the dramatic improvement of a "leapfrogging"

("IESG"), and the Internet Research Task Force (IESG"). These bodies are the standards setting
and research arms of the Internet community. Internet standards are developed by the IETF, then
considered by the IESG, with appeal to the IAB, and finally promulgated by the ISOC as
international standards.
"I The W3C was created in October 1994 by Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the Web, to develop

common protocols that promote the evolution and ensure the interoperability of the World Wide
Web.
'
See The Internet Standards Process-Revision3, RFC 2026, §§ 10.3.2-10.4 (Scott Bradner
ed., October 1996), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2026.txt.
146 See Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Patent Flap Could Slow Multilingual Domain Name Plan,
COMPUTERWORLD,
Mar. 28, 2001, available at http://eomputerworld.com/ewi/story/0%/2Cl199%o
2CNAV47_ST059043_NLTam%2CO0.html (last visited April 6, 2001).
147 See Daniel J. Weitzner, Patent Standards: A Path Forward to Preserve Openness and

Innovation in

the Evolving

Web

Infrastructure, §

1

(Oct.

25,

2000),

available at

http ://www.w3.org/2000/10/24-patents-standards.html.
148

World Wide Web Consortium Process Document, § 2.2 (Feb. 8, 2001), available at

http ://www.w3.org/Consortium/Process-20010208/.
'1
However, while the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, 1992 (as amended), supra note 141,
expressly states that "there is no objection in principle to preparing an International Standard in
terms which include the use of items covered by patent rights," the ISO Web page does state,
somewhat contradictorily, that "[t]he strong recommendation to standards developers is to avoid
reference to patented items in ISO publications."

15o See David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic Approach, 19
DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1994).
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standard will be able to dislodge it.151 Therefore, in network industries such as
software, it may be of particular importance for standard-setting organizations to
select the "best" standard, incorporating the best patented technologies, rather than
the most open standard that is free from patents. That is, if the total social utility
derived from a more limited use of a patented standard exceeds the total social utility
derived from a more widespread use of the open standard utilizing sub-optimal
technology, then the standard setting organization should support the standard
incorporating the best patented technologies. 152 Finally, by accepting patented
technologies in standards, standard-setting organizations encourage participants not
only to introduce already developed patented technologies into the process, but also
to commit more resources to develop better technology during the process in hopes of
acquiring patents.
Furthermore, software standard-setting organizations devoted to open
standards will be unable to control patents acquired by entities that are not involved
in the standard-setting process. There are at least two scenarios that can arise.
First, particularly in an increasingly crowded field like software, "renegade" patents
covering aspects of a formal standard may issue to inventors not involved in the
standard-setting process, but having nevertheless independently invented and
patented technology used by the standard. For example, in 1987, CompuServe, Inc.
introduced the Graphics Interchange Format ("GIF") for archiving and exchanging
computer images. 153 CompuServe released it as a free and open standard and for the
next seven years, GIF grew to be the most popular file format. 154 However, the GIF
file format utilized the LZW compression algorithm for which Unisys had acquired a
patent that issued in 1985 and was apparently unknown to CompuServe and others
in the online community. 155 For the next six years, Unisys entered into over 2,000
1 56
license agreements, making it perhaps the most widely licensed patent in history.
While more a de facto standard rather than a formal standard-setting situation, the
GIF story nevertheless demonstrates that third parties holding patents can affect an
open standard effort. More recently, in the formal standard setting situation, the
IETF stated that it was prepared to move to sub-optimal alternative proposed
standards for supporting multilingual Internet domain names if the owner of a thirdparty patent covering the optimal standard refused to freely and openly license its
patent.1 57 Indeed, standard-setting organizations that openly disfavor patents may
increase the incentives for "submarine" patent situations where third-party patent

15' See Lemley, supra note 23, at 1058.
152 Indeed, if inframarginal externalities,

see supra note 26, exist such that the marginal

benefits of network size are exhausted once a critical mass is achieved, the patented standard would
be a better choice as long as the patent holder offers reasonable licenses such that the critical mass
can be achieved.
s,)3 See The GIF Controversy: A Software Developer's Perspective, available at http://
cloanto.com/users/mcb/19950127giflzw.html (last visited March 21, 2001).
'F Id.

5 d.
IF
1,6 See Mark K. Anderson, The Latest GIF Tiff THE STANDARD (April 25, 2000), available at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/1,1151,14486, 00.html.
157 See Marsan, supra note 146.
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holders do not reveal or assert patents related to a standard until the standard has
15
been adopted and has gained momentum in industry. S
Second, regardless of whether a standard-setting organization promotes an open
standard that is free from intellectual property protection, competitors may still
acquire patents that surround the landscape or boundaries of the standard. These
third-party patents can block free use of the standard. For example, patents on
specific software implementations of an open standard or on hardware devices that
use the standard can be, for all practical purposes, necessary for effective use of that
standard in a commercial product. Such a situation is analogous to the earlier
discussed Japanese practice of holding a core technology patent "hostage" by
surrounding it with small improvement patents. In both these situations, where
patents are either included within the standard or surround the standard, techniques
like patent pooling, as discussed in the next Part, can increase accessibility to the
standard and increase the social utility derived from network effects.

IV.

THE EFFECT OF PATENT POOLING ON SOFTWARE INNOVATION

As discussed above, software patents are an important and perhaps inevitable
consideration in both setting and using software standards.
Specifically, the
acceptance of patented software technology by standard setting organizations
provides the correct incentives for disclosure of the best patented technologies.
Choosing the best standard over the most open standard can increase the social
utility derived from network effects. Furthermore, renegade patents and patents
surrounding the landscape of the standard can still infiltrate use of the standard
despite efforts to make it open. In light of these factors, it is clear that if patents are
not licensed on a royalty-free basis, then consumers and developers will have more
limited access to standards that incorporate patented technology. Thus, to maximize
the availability of such standards, cost-reducing techniques such as patent pooling
should be utilized. Additionally, by increasing access to the standard, patent pooling
encourages the development of further efficiencies in standardized software.
However, such development may, ironically, be accompanied by a corresponding
retardation in innovation in the standards market. This Part first examines the
economics of patent pooling and then reviews the historical and current antitrust
treatment given to such pooling. It then concludes that although patent pooling
arrangements may lead to more efficient development of standardized software, they
will also likely lead to a further retardation of research and invention in the
standards market by increasing the incentive to create standards-compliant
software.

A. Economics ofPatentPooling
Patent pooling typically arises when multiple patents held by different
companies are required to produce a given product. 159 This may occur, for example,

158 See

Shapiro, supra note 1, at 9.
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when the product is made of an aggregation of components, each of which may
require a patent to make. 160 When the actual or potential manufacturers do not hold
any of these patents, the pooling of the required patents into a central independent
entity is useful to facilitate patent licensing to those manufacturers. 16 1 This central
entity is typically a partnership or limited liability company that administers the
licensing of the patent pool. 162 The entity may sell licenses to the patent pool as a
package and then accordingly divide up the royalty stream generated through the
163
licensing revenues to the patent holders.
When the patents in the pool are either blocking or complementary patents,
such an arrangement can achieve great efficiencies. A second patent is "blocked"
when it cannot be used without the first patent. The first patent may or may not be
blocked without the second patent.1 64 Blocking typically arises when there is a first
1 65
pioneer patent and a subsequent improvement patent on the pioneer invention.
That is, the improvement patent may not be practiced without acquiring rights under
the pioneer patent. Furthermore, if the pioneer patent may still be practiced without
the improvement patent, it may nevertheless be impractical to do so. Similarly,
complementary patents are patents whose value increases when combined with a
separate patented invention.1 66 Often one patent has no value absent a license to the
other patent.1 67 For example, a patent for a razor shaving handle and a patent for a
connecting razor cartridge are complementary patents.
Both blocking and
complementary patents that are owned by separate companies can create a situation
known as the "tragedy of the anticommons."1 68 The tragedy of the anticommons
occurs where a manufacturer must acquire licensing rights from multiple patent
holders in order to create a single useful product.1 69 As a result, it is much more
difficult to develop the product, leading to its underutilization.17 0 Patent pooling
addresses the tragedy of the anticommons by aggregating blocking and
complementary patents and reducing the transaction costs needed to acquire
licenses. 171 In contrast, patent pools that include competing or rival patents
15 Id.
160 See Steven C. Carlson, PatentPools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359,
364-65 (1999).
161See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 9.
162 See Carlson, supra note 160, at 368.
163 See id.
164 See id. at 362-63.
165 Carlson describes the classic pioneer-improvement situation concerning the Wright
brothers' pioneer patent on the wings of an aircraft. Subsequently, Glenn Curtis and Alexander
Graham Bell improved on the Wright brothers' pioneer invention and received a patent for using a
set of wing flaps to stabilize the aircraft. However, the Curtis patent was found to infringe the
Wright patent. Similarly, the Wright brothers had no legal right to license the crucial technology of
wing flaps for their wings. Thus, the Wright and Curtis patents mutually infringed and blocked one
another. Id. at 363.
'6

See Roger B. Andewalt, PracticalProblem in Counseling,. Analysis ofPatent Pools under

the Antitrust Laws, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 613 (1984).
167 See Carlson, supra note 160, at 364-65.
168 Soo Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The

Antieommons in Biomedieal Roseareh, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
139 Id. at 699.
170 Id.

171See Carlson, supra note 160, at 379.
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(different from competing or rival patent owners) do not address the tragedy of the
anticommons, but rather eliminate competition and can lead to higher prices through
172
collusive price fixing.
From the perspective of the manufacturer, patent pools are clearly beneficial
because they provide a convenient "one stop shop" by clearing blocking patents and
significantly reducing transaction costs by eliminating the need to negotiate with
each patent holder. 173 Furthermore, by offering a package license for all necessary
patents, a pool greatly reduces the concern that a patent owner will "hold out" for
higher royalties, knowing that the manufacturer has individually negotiated for and
already acquired the rest of the necessary complementary and blocking patent
licenses, and that the value of all those licenses depends on obtaining a license to its
own patent. 174 However, momentarily putting aside antitrust issues of market
power, collusion, and price-fixing, it is less obvious why the patent holders,
themselves, would have an economic incentive to form such pools. After all, their
monopolistic position with respect to their patented technologies already enable them
to set monopoly prices. However, as Cournot demonstrated in 1838, an integration of
complementary monopolies can lead to even higher profits, consumer surplus, social
welfare than if those monopolies were "stacked" one on top of the other. 175 Thus,
complementary patent owners will find it in their joint interest to offer a package
price that is actually less than if each patent owner had licensed their technologies
separately. 176
Specifically, pricing externalities arising from the double
marginalization of stacked monopolies are internalized when these monopolies are
integrated, enabling the integrated entity to offer lower prices yet still achieve higher
profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare.
Although the clearing of blocking patents and the reduction of transaction costs
are perhaps the primary pro-competitive effects of patent pools, commentators have
identified several other benefits.
For example, by increasing access to patented
technologies by lowering costs, pooling can lead to production efficiencies, increased
output, and lower prices. 177 Furthermore, patent pools reduce the need for costly
patent litigation because such disputes can be settled through pooling
arrangements. 178 They also facilitate the rapid development of new technology by
179
enabling pool members and licensees to build upon all the patents in the pool.
Patent pools also enable pool members to share the risks and benefits of further
research and development by distributing patent royalties among members who have
invested resources to create patented inventions, thereby increasing the probability
that such members will recoup their investments.180 Finally, patent pooling provides
an institutionalized exchange of technical information not covered by patents that

172See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 17.
173 See JEANE CLARK ET AL., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO
THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 8 (December 5, 2000).
174See id. at 9; Brunetti, supra note 20.
175 See Shapiro, .supranote 1, at 4-5.
176 Id.

177See Andewalt, supra note 166, at 614.
178

See Carlson, supra note 160, at 380.

179Id. at 37980.
180Id. at 38182.
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fosters communication and reduces overlap and redundancies in future inventions.1 81
However, patent pool critics have also identified several potential anti-competitive
effects as well.1 82 For example, although patents can be legally blocking, they may
also be factually competitive.1 83 That is, companies may make and sell competing
products that infringe others' patents because such patents are simply not
asserted.1 84 A pooling of such patents that would not otherwise have been asserted
by individual companies can reduce the competition between these companies and
increase prices.1 85 Additionally, pools can also shield patents that would have been
determined to be invalid in litigation.1 86 Finally, pools can increase the risk that
members will collude and price-fix.187

B. Antitrust History of PatentPooling
While the foregoing suggests that patent pooling can be beneficial for both pool
members and patent licensees, antitrust authorities are more concerned with the
benefits and harms of patent pooling to consumers.188 Federal antitrust agencies as
well as antitrust jurisprudence have gone through various perspectives regarding
patent pools. The mid-1800s to early-1900s was a period that saw great deference to
patent pools and their effect on restraining trade. Prior to the passage of the
Sherman Act in 1890, the sewing machine industry saw one of the first patent pools
arise in 1856.18 9 In 1902, the Supreme Court in Bement v. National Harrow Co.
affirmed the triumph of patent law and freedom of contract over antitrust
concerns. 190 National Harrow Company was a holding company formed by harrow
manufacturers to license their patents. 191
Bement was one of the harrow
manufacturers that assigned its patents to National Harrow.1 92 When National
Harrow brought suit against Bement for violating certain contracts regarding patent
rights and royalties, Bement argued that such contracts were void because National
Harrow, together with its contributing harrow manufacturers (including Bement,

181 See CLARK ET AL.,
182 See

sup-rn note 173, at 10.

generally Michael F. Bailey, PatentPools and the MPEG LA Consortium, White Paper,

Brown & Bain, P.A. (October 1997). For purposes of this article, I do not consider patent pools as
consisting of competing patents, but only of blocking and complementary patents. However, it is
clear that patent pools containing competing patents are likely to be detrimental to competition in
the patent licensing market, increasing the possibility of market power or collusion. See generally,
Andewalt, supra note 166.
183 See Carlson, supra note 160, at 384-87.
184

Id.

185 Id.
186
187

Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 388.

See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 9.
The members of the sewing machine patent pool were Elias Howe, Wheeler and Wilson,
Grover and Baker, and I.M. Singer. They dominated the industry until after 1877, when the
majority of the patents in the pool expired. See FLOYD L. VAtUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT
188
189

SYSTEM: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY 39-68 (1956).
190 Bemont v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
191 Id.
192 Id.
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itself), were members of a combination to regulate output and fix prices in violation
of the Sherman Act.193 The Supreme Court disagreed, however, holding the contracts
valid and asserting that National Harrow, as the owner of the patents, enjoyed
absolute freedom to license such patents under any conditions imposed by the
patentee (i.e., National Harrow) and agreed to by the licensee (i.e., Bement).194 For
the Court, "[tihe fact that the conditions in the contracts [kept] up the monopoly or
195
fix[ed] prices [did] not render them illegal."
By 1912, however, as large corporations began to supplant individual inventors
in the exploitation of patents, the Court shifted its attitude and began to condemn
patent pooling as a practice that did indeed violate the Sherman Act. 196 In Standard
Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 197 the Court condemned a patent pool
for enameled ware as a combination in violation of the Sherman Act. The Court
observed that by forming the patent pool, the contributing manufacturers "subjected
themselves to certain rules and regulations, among others not to sell their product to
the jobbers except at a price fixed not by trade and competitive conditions but by the
decision of the committee."19 8
For the Court, the patent pool agreements
"transcended what was necessary to protect the use of the patent or the monopoly
which the law conferred upon it."199 The lower courts continued to strike down
patent pooling arrangements in industries ranging from motion pictures to
automobile bumpers. 200
The Supreme Court's anti-patent pool jurisprudence
continued in 1931 with Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States where it developed a
market power test to determine whether a pool of competing patents could violate the
Sherman Act. 201 In 1948, the Court showed that it would even strike down
arrangements to combine blocking patents (as opposed to competing patents) if pricefixing was involved. 20 2 In United States v. Line Material Co., the Court determined
that a cross-licensing arrangement between a pioneer patent holder and an
improvement patent holder for an electric fuse cutout was per se unlawful under the
203
Sherman Act because such agreements included price maintenance provisions.

13

[d.

'91

Id. at 91.

19 Id.

See Vaughan, supra note 189, at 43-44.
197220 U.S. 20 (1912).
198Id.at 47.
'9 Id. at 48.
200 See United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 F. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1915). See generally
Vaughan, supra note 189, at 46-47.
201 Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. U.S., 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931) ("If combining patent owners
effectively dominate an industry, that power to fix and maintain royalties is tantamount to the
power to fix prices. Where domination exists, a pooling of competing process patents . . . is beyond
the privileges conferred by the patents and constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act." (citations
omitted)).
202 See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
203 Id. at 314.
'96

Even if a
monopolize
to exploit
agreement

patentee has a right in the absence of a purpose to restrain or
trade, to fix prices on a licensee's sale of the patented product in order
properly his invention or inventions, when patentees join in an
as here to maintain prices on their several products, that agreement,
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The forties also saw the Court begin to adopt regulatory forms of remedies to deal
with suspicious patent pools.204 Rather than dissolving such pools, the Court began
to mandate compulsory licenses with reasonable royalties. 20 5 For example, in
Hartford-Empire v. United States, 20 6 the Court applied its market power test from
Standard Oil and struck down perhaps one of the most infamous pooling
arrangements as violating the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Controlling over six
hundred pooled patents in the glass industry, Hartford-Empire, a company
specifically formed to pool the patents of glass companies, licensed machinery to
make ninety-four percent of the glass containers manufactured in the United States
on feeders and formers. 20 7 The Court noted that "by cooperative arrangements and
binding agreements, the appellant corporations, over a period of years, regulated and
suppressed competition in the use of glassmaking machinery and employed their
joint patent position to allocate fields of manufacture and to maintain prices of
unpatented glassware." 208 As part of its remedy, the Court compelled the glass
companies to license their patents without discrimination or restriction at standard
royalty rates. 20 9 Such compulsory licenses have formed the basis of the nondiscrimination and reasonable royalty provisions seen in the agreements of modern
210
patent pool structures.
When the United States Department of Justice began to articulate its antitrust
policies in the late 1960s, it followed the lead of the Court in expressing hostility and
suspicion towards restraints caused by patent licensing arrangements. 211 The
Justice Department presumed that patents conferred monopoly power on the patent
owner and therefore adopted the position that patents were to be treated more
harshly than other assets under the antitrust laws.212 This approach culminated in a
list of "Nine No-Nos" regarding patent licensing, which the Justice Department
viewed as per se illegal. 213
Such aggressive policies adopted by the antitrust

however advantageous it may be to stimulate the broader use of patents, is
unlawful per se under the Sherman Act.

Id.
204 See Andewalt, supra note 166, at 636.

See id.;
Vaughan,supra note 189, at 78.
206 323 U.S. 386, 406 (1945).
207 Id. at 400.
208 Id. at 406.
209 Id. at 413-20.
210 See MPEG-2 Letter, .supra note 18, at 4 ("Pursuant to the Licensing Administrator
Agreement, MPEG-LA . . . shall not discriminate among potential licensees."); MPEG-2 Letter,
supra note 18, at 14 ("[The MPEG-2 Licensor's] undertakings to the ISO and/or the ITU-T obligate it
to license on fair and reasonable terms.").
211 See Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, The 1995 Federal Antitrust
Guidelnes for the Licensingof IntellectualProperty:Commentary and Text 4 (1996).
212 See id. at 5;Andewalt, supra note 166, at 620.
213 The Nine No-Nos were:
205

(1) requiring a licensee to buy unpatented materials from the licensor;
(2) requiring a licensee to assign to the patentee any patent which may be
issued to the licensee after the license agreement is executed;
(3) attempting to restrict the purchaser of a patented product in the resale of
that product;
(4) restricting the licensee's freedom to deal in products or services not
within the scope of the patent;
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enforcement agencies have resulted in a great reluctance of companies to initiate
pooling arrangements. 214 For example, the threat of an antitrust suit by a member of
a patent pool could be used to influence negotiations for higher royalty rates, thereby
compromising the integrity and advantages of the pool. 215 Alternatively, the threat of
an antitrust suit by a licensee could pressure the pooling entity to reduce royalty
rates. 216 Such threats of government antitrust action have caused a decline in the
formation of patent pools despite the potential benefits and efficiencies brought by
properly structured pools.

C. Current Treatment ofPatentPooling
However, the Justice Department has since renounced the "Nine No-Nos,"217 and
it seems that patent pooling arrangements may be primed for a resurgence. 218 With
the joint release of the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
("IP Guidelines")219 in 1995 and the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among

(5) agreeing with the licensee that the licensor will not, without the
licensee's consent, grant further licenses to any other person;
(6) requiring the licensee to take a package license;
(7) requiring the licensee to pay royalties, including total sales royalties, in
an amount not reasonably related to the licensee's sales of products covered by the
patent;
(8) attempting to restrict a process patent licensee's sales of products made
by the patented process; and
(9) requiring a licensee to adhere to any specified or minimum price in its
sale of licensed product.
Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice,
Remarks to Michigan State Bar Antitrust Law Section and Patent Trademark and Copyright Law
Section (Sept. 21, 1972), reprintedin [Current Comment Transfer Binder, 1969-1983] Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH)
50,146; Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, Law on Licensing Practices: Myth Or Reality?, Remarks to the American
Patent Law Ass'n, Washington D.C. (Jan.21, 1975).
214 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liabity Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1355 (1996) ("[F]ederal antitrust policy is
most likely the explanation for the small number of patent pools existing today.").
215

Id.

Id.
217 See Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
216

Department of Justice, Special Considerations Concerning InternationalPatent and Know-How
Licensing and Joint Research and Development Activities: Current Antitrust Division Views on
Patent Licensing Practices, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 515 (1981) ("Having buried the 'Nine No-Nos'
individually, let me now perform a partial collective resurrection: I have analyzed each of these
rules, and have found in almost every instance that they are overinclusive or contain at least some
element of economic irrationality.").
218 See, e.g., Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department
of Justice, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, Address Before the American Intellectual Property
Law Association 3 (May 2, 1997) ("To put matters in perspective, I should make clear at the outset
that I would expect that by far most cross-licenses and pools are, on balance, procompetitive."),
available athttp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm; Brunetti, supra note 20.
219 See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of IntelleetualProperty(April 6, 1995), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm [hereinafter IP Guidelines].
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Competitors ("Collaboration Guidelines")220 in 2000 by the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission, the federal antitrust agencies now expressly
recognize that patent pooling arrangements can have important pro-competitive
benefits. 221 In contrast to positions adopted by the antitrust agencies in past eras,
the IP Guidelines assert three general principles that suggest a more liberal stance
on the antitrust enforcement of patent pools. 222 The three general principles are:
(a) for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the federal antitrust agencies
regard intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any form of
223
property;
(b) the federal antitrust agencies do not presume that intellectual
property creates market power in the antitrust context; 224 and
(c) the federal antitrust agencies recognize that intellectual property
licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of production and
225
is generally pro-competitive.
In analyzing patent pool arrangements, the Department of Justice collapses the
above principles into two main inquiries: (1) whether the proposed licensing program
at issue is likely to integrate complementary patent rights; and (2) if so, whether the
resulting competitive benefits are likely to be outweighed by competitive harm posed
by other aspects of the program. 226 Applying this approach, the Department of
Justice has recently approved three patent pools. The first, discussed later in more
detail, was the approval of a patent pool for the MPEG-2 standard in 1997.227
MPEG-2 is a complex standard approved by the ISO for the digital compression of
video and audio for entertainment TV. 228 It is a fundamental technology upon which
high definition television ("HDTV"), digital cable television systems, digital versatile
discs ("DVD"), and other forms of digital video storage, transport, and display are
based. 229 Unlike MPEG-2, the DVD standard specification is not the result of formal
standard setting but of private collaboration resulting in a de facto industry

220 See Antitrust Guidelines for CollaborationsAmong Competitors (April 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OOO/O4/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Collaboration Guidelines].
221 While the Collaboration Guidelines, issued five years after the IP Guidelines, provides a

general statement and analytical framework of the federal antitrust agencies' approach towards
competitor collaborations, it remains consistent and defers to the IP Guidelines regarding
intellectual property issues. Id. at 2 n.4.
222 See IP Guidelines, supra note 219, at § 2.0.
223 Id.
224

Id.

225 Id.
226
227

228

See Toshiba Review Letter, supra note 19, at 9.
See MPEG-2 Letter, supra note 18.

See

BRUCE

G.

HASKELL, ET AL., DIGITAL VIDEO:

(1997).
229 See CLARK ET AL.,

supra note 173, at 13.

AN INTRODUCTION TO

MPEG-2, at 3
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standard.230 Nevertheless, after the approval of the MPEG-2 patent pool, the
Department of Justice approved two more patent pools, both relating to DVD
technology. In 1998, the Department of Justice approved a pooling arrangement
formed by Sony, Philips, and Pioneer for the licensing of patents that are "essential"
to comply with the DVD-Video 23 1 or DVD-ROM 23 2 standard specifications. 233 In 1999,
the Department of Justice again approved another DVD pooling arrangement, this
time formed by Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba, and Victor,
for the licensing of patents essential for the manufacture of DVDs, DVD players, and
DVD decoders. Indeed, the antitrust agencies are not the only federal bodies that
have recognized the benefits of patent pooling arrangements. Most recently, the PTO
issued a white paper recommending the formation of patent pools in the
biotechnology field to address the lack of access to patented inventions based on
234
genetic information for research and development.

D. RetardationofInnovation Through PatentPooling
As suggested by the foregoing, the more liberal position of federal agencies
regarding antitrust scrutiny of patent pooling arrangements combined with the
narrower interpretation of patent claims under Festo provide an environment in
which companies may be encouraged to form more patent pools for at least two
reasons.
First, in a more tolerant antitrust regime, companies holding
complementary patents are encouraged to eliminate the double marginalization
effect of stacked monopolies by combining their patents into a pool. Companies will
have the incentive to do this because, as discussed earlier, the package price of the
pool can lead to higher profits for the companies.
Second, the narrower
interpretation of patent claims in Festo also increases the incentive of companies to
form patent pools as it becomes increasingly possible for other companies to surround
a narrowly construed pioneer patent with a multitude of small improvement patents.
However, although federal antitrust agencies now expressly recognize the
potential pro-competitive benefits of patent pooling, their consideration of the effects

230 The DVD standard was developed and announced in 1995 by the DVD Consortium, an
association of hardware and software manufacturers including Toshiba, Time Warner, Sony and
Philips. In 1997, the Consortium was replaced by the DVD Forum, which, today, includes more
than 200 companies. See DVD White Paper, available at http://www.toshiba.com/taecdpd/products/
docs/dvdwhitepapers.html (last visited April 8, 2001).
2,31 DVD-Video describes a high capacity, read-only format for the interactive playback of high
quality video, audio and graphics designed for viewing movies and other visual entertainment. See
id.;
DVD Primer,at http://www.dvdforum.org/tech-dvdprimer.html (last updated Sep. 6, 2001).
2,32 DVI-ROM describes a format similar to DVI-Video that also includes computer-friendly
file formats. It is used to store data. See DVD Primer, supra note 231.
2,3,3The term "essential" is defined as "necessary (as a practical matter) for compliance with the
DVD[-Video or DVI)-ROM] Standard Specifications." Sony Review Letter, supra note 19, at Section
II.A. In other words, essential patents are "inevitabl[y] infringed by compliance with the
specifications." Id.
234 See CLARK ET AL., supra note 173.
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of such pools on future innovation is much stronger than in the past. 235 Under the IP
Guidelines, if the number of companies with the required capabilities to develop
technologies to compete with a patent pooled technology is relatively small compared
to the number of pool members, a federal antitrust agency may utilize the concept of
236
an "innovation market" to analyze the competitive effects of the patent pool.
Specifically, the antitrust agency will consider whether the patent pool would give
pool members an anti-competitive incentive to collectively reduce investment in, or
otherwise retard the pace or scope of research efforts. 237 The agency will balance
such anti-competitive considerations with other pro-competitive considerations, such
as the potential for combining complementary research of pool members in such a
way as to make successful innovation more likely.238 For example, using this
approach, the Department of Justice concluded that the MPEG-2 patent pool did not
23 9
discourage pool members from developing or supporting rival standards.
However, when the patent pool is directed towards an accepted standardized
technology within a network industry, the innovation analysis under the IP
Guidelines does not seem to go far enough. As suggested earlier, the literature on
standards suggests that once standardization is achieved in a network industry,
network effects such as excess inertia can retard innovation by preventing the
adoption of a newer, more efficient standard. 240 However, such literature is premised
on the assumption that there has already been enough incentive for competitors to
develop alternative choices to the current standard. The effects of patent pooling
may weaken this assumption. That is, absent a patent pool arrangement, the cost to
implement a patented incumbent standard may be prohibitive to certain companies.
Thus, rather than develop products under the standard, these companies will commit
their resources to researching new technologies that may possibly leapfrog over the
incumbent standard. With patent pools, however, the significant reduction of
transaction costs enables some of these companies to acquire package licenses and
develop products compatible with the incumbent standard. As a result, the amount
of resources invested in researching possible leapfrogging technologies is reduced and
shifted towards product development under the incumbent standard. With fewer
resources committed to researching leapfrogging technologies, innovation in the
standards market may be retarded, and it is thus less likely that a beneficial
leapfrogging technology will arise to replace the incumbent standard. Furthermore,
it may be the case that the resources shifted to developing products within the
incumbent standard may lead to more efficient methods of product development.
Such an effect might be termed a "Japanification" effect, akin to the historic patterns
of Japan where, as discussed earlier, improvements in industrial development
flourished while the discovery of fundamental inventions lagged.

235

Soo Klein, supra note 218, at 11 ("Today, I believe that the impact on the members'

incentives to innovate would receive at least a bit more attention.").
236 See IP Guidelines, supra note 219, at § 3.2.3, Example 3.
237 See

238

id. Example 4.
See id.

239

See MPEG-2 Letter, supra note 18, at 12.

240 See Farrell, supra note 22, at 37; Farrell & Saloner, supra note 46, at 72; Hinshaw, supra

note 23, at 307.
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While the "Japanification" effect from patent pools may reduce innovation in the
standards market, innovation within the incumbent standard may still benefit from
pooling arrangements. As noted earlier, pooling arrangements enable pool members
to combine resources and technologies for further research. However, such research
seems inevitably skewed towards retaining the incumbent standard and may lead to
future technologies that are constrained by concerns for backwards compatibility
with the incumbent standard. 241 As such, a leapfrogging standard also seems less
likely to emerge from such research to replace the incumbent standard. Thus, as can
be seen, patent pooling arrangements may lead to more efficient development of
standardized products, but such arrangements may also lead to further retardation
of research and invention in the standards market by increasing the incentive to
create standards- compliant products.

E. Analysis of the MPEG-LA Pool
The patent pool for the MPEG-2 standard administered under the MPEG-LA
provides a good real-world example to further explore some of points made in this
article. A scheme for the digital compression of video and audio for entertainment
TV, the MPEG-2 standard is perhaps one of the most versatile and complicated
communication standards ever written. 242 It was approved as a formal standard by
the ISO on November 11, 1994.243 Since then, the ISO endorsement has helped it
become a widely accepted technology that serves as a fundamental technology for
HDTV, digital cable television systems, DVD, and other forms of digital video
storage, transport and display. 244 The MPEG-2 standard is widely recognized as a
great technical achievement in digital video compression. 245 Commenting scientists
have maintained that its technical success can be attributed, in part, to the
246
recognition of MPEG-2 patent rights by the ISO/JEC JTC 1 standard setting body.
As noted earlier, an MPEG-2 patent pool formed by the Trustees of Columbia
University, Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc.,
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips
Electronics N.C., Scientific Atlanta, Inc., and Sony Corp. was approved by the

241 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 35, at 95 ("Although compatibility has obvious benefits,

obtaining and maintaining compatibility often involves a sacrifice in terms of product variety or
restraints on innovation.").
242 See Haskell, supra note 228, at xiii.
243

See id.

244 See CLARK ET AL., supra note 173, at 13.
245 In 1996, the ISO and IEC received an Emmy Award for Outstanding Achievement in

Technological Development for their development of the MPEG-2 standard. See ISO, IECAwarded

Emmy for Standards that Provide High Quality Audio and Video Programming to Consumers,
available athttp://www.mpeg.org/MPEG/award.html (last visited April 4, 2002).
246 See Eric D. Scheirer, MPEG, Patents, and Open Source, WEBNOIZE MAGAZINE (May 10,
1999) ("If MPEG had not allowed standards to contain patented technology (this is the approach
taken by, for example, the W3C), then the open standard would simply not be as good as the
proprietary standards. In the long run it was viewed that this would fracture the market, and would
inspire development of multiple independent and incompatible solutions."), available at
http://www.webnoize.com/.
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Department of Justice in 1997.247 Under the MPEG-2 patent pool arrangement,
MPEG-2 patent owners commit to license their patents jointly through a common
license administrator ("MPEG-LA").248 MPEG-LA assumes the tasks of granting
portfolio licenses to users in a nondiscriminatory manner and collecting and
distributing royalty income. 249 Under the arrangement, the patents in the pool have
to be "essential," meaning any patent that is necessary for compliance with the
MPEG-2 standard. 250 Assessment of the "essentiality" of patents is made by an
251
independent patent expert familiar with the standard and the relevant technology.
Moreover, MPEG-LA is required to grant licenses to any potential licensees, without
discrimination and at a reasonable royalty rate. 252 Additionally, the license has a
grant-back provision that requires the licensee to grant to the licensor and other
portfolio licensees a nonexclusive license, under fair and reasonable terms and
253
conditions, on any essential patent that the licensee has a right to license.
In approving the MPEG-2 patent pool, the Department of Justice noted several
important aspects of the arrangement.
First, the limitation of the pool to
complementary essential patents determined by an independent expert helped to
ensure that no non-essential competitive patents would be bundled together, thereby
254
foreclosing competitive implementation options left open by the MPEG-2 standard.
Second, the commitment to offer licenses on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms minimized the ability to use the pool as a vehicle to disadvantage competitors
255
in downstream markets or to collude on the prices of downstream products.
Finally, the Department of Justice noted that the MPEG-2 patent pool would not
restrain innovation. That is, pool members were not discouraged, either through
outright prohibition or economic incentives, from developing or supporting a rival
standard. 256 Additionally, licensees were free to independently make products that
257
did not comply with the MPEG-2 standard.
While the Department of Justice's approval of the MPEG-2 patent pool was an
important step in encouraging pro-competitive patent pooling arrangements, certain
aspects of its analysis deserve discussion. First, the Department of Justice's
conception of the "essentiality" of a patent seems misguided. For example, MPEG-2
encoders are not specified by the MPEG-2 standard. 258 Thus, patents involving
MPEG-2 encoders are not deemed to be "essential" by the MPEG-LA. However, a
manufacturer desiring to build a suite of MPEG-2 products including both encoders
and decoders, despite taking a portfolio license from MPEG-LA, might still have to
incur high transaction costs to obtain licenses from various MPEG-2 encoder patent
owners. As described earlier, such MPEG-2 encoder patents surround the landscape

247
218

See MPEG-2 Letter, supra note 18.
Id. at 3.

9 Id..
250 Id. at 10 n.4.
"51Id. at 4.
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254 Id. at 10.
255 Id. at 1011.
256 Id. at 12.
253 Id.
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See Haskell, supra note 228, at xii.

[1:274 2002]

Research Versus Development

of the MPEG-2 standard and may nevertheless be "essential" from the perspective of
certain manufacturers. Furthermore, the Department of Justice's conclusion that
innovation is not restrained by the MPEG-2 patent pool does not seem to consider the
positional strength of an accepted standard. That is, as noted earlier, the reduction
of transaction costs by the MPEG-2 patent pool may indeed lead to a retardation of
innovation in the digital video compression market, because the lower cost of access
to MPEG-2 may convince manufacturers to take a portfolio license rather than invest
in new lines of research. This reduction in research may make it less likely that a
potentially beneficial new digital video compression technology will emerge to
leapfrog over the MPEG-2 standard. 259 Innovations in digital video compression may
still emerge, but they will more likely be skewed towards backward-compatible (but
potentially cumbersome) technologies developed and driven by continued
collaboration among pool members and buoyed by their desire to maintain the
260
standard in the industry.

V.

CONCLUSION

Patent pooling should generally be regarded as a practice with potentially strong
pro-competitive benefits. With encouraging federal antitrust agencies and narrower
claim interpretations under Festo, patent pooling arrangements seem ready for a
resurgence. However, where the pooling involves a standard within a network
industry, further research is needed to determine its effect on the standards
innovation market. The current literature on standards typically begins its analyses
from a presumption that that there are already existing alternative technologies
trying to dethrone an incumbent standard. However, a patent pool arrangement for
an incumbent standard may strengthen its position and actually result in fewer
competing technologies. By decreasing access costs to participate in the standard,
patent pooling increases the amount of participants in the standard, thereby
spurring further efficiencies and improvements in the development of standardized
products. However, at the same time, participants who would have otherwise
researched new technologies to overcome the incumbent will now select the less risky
choice of developing standardized products. This effect has the potential to reduce
the level of research and invention in new technologies that can compete with the
incumbent standard. Depending on the strength of this effect, the end result may be
backward-compatible
(and
potentially
cumbersome)
innovations
driven
predominantly by the patent pool members who have strong incentives to maintain
their position as the industry standard.

259

In

contrast, it seems clear that development and improvements in MPEG-2-related

technologies are stronger than ever. Soo gonerally MPEG2 and Video Services, The Insight
Research Corporation (April 1999).
260 For example, the newer MPEG-4 technology, which was finalized by the ISO/IEC JTC 1 in
1999, was intended to be backwards-compatible with MPEG-2. Haskell, supra note 228, at 369.

